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Counter Revolutions via Extremist Groups: 
Tunisia and Syria 
Lamia Jihad Al Masri 
Abstract 
 
The end of the year 2010 incorporated a highly significant set of events in the Middle 
East And North Africa (MENA) region. Islamic radical groups have capitalized on the 
anarchy and have managed to spread terror in more than one Arab country. As a result, 
the promised democratic transition of the Arab Spring has been halted and countered by 
radical extremism. According to Samuel Huntington, every democratic wave has its 
counter reverse wave. Is the sequence of events in the MENA region considered to be a 
form of Huntington’s reverse wave, or is the MENA region and its Islamic radicalism 
antithetical to democracy? 
This thesis aims to draw a comparative analysis between a respectively successful 
transition presented by the Tunisian case study, verses a failed transition presented by 
the Syrian case study. The comparison is based on three levels of analysis- international 
community, regional powers, and local governance. The purpose of the comparison is to 
draw the main transitional indicators in both countries and link them to Huntington’s 
factors of reverse waves to be able to conclude whether Huntington’s theory of reverse 
waves can be applied to the MENA region.  
 
Keywords: Arab, Spring, Tunisia, Syria, Reverse, Waves, Democracy, Radical, Islam, 
Moderate, Transition, MENA, Exceptionalism. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Arab Spring into a Jihadi Spring 
 The end of the year 2010 witnessed the spread of democratic movements in the 
Arab world known as the Arab Spring. Protests and riots have led to revolutions in five 
prominent Arab countries. Nevertheless, the promises of democracy and civil rights have 
been shattered. Five years after the start of the Arab Spring, a wave of sectarian 
extremism has overwhelmed liberal promises, and an Islamist ‘Jihadi Spring’ seems to 
have replaced that of the Arab Spring in some countries (The Economist, 2014). 
Extremism has capitalized on the spread of anarchy and turmoil. Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS), al-Nusra Front, and other extremist groups have waged a campaign of 
terror against opponents while gaining control over large territories in Syria and Iraq. 
Many scholars have been optimistic about the Arab Spring and the snowballing effect 
that has followed it. However, in light of current events and political changes, such 
optimism has been met by an increasingly growing sentiment of pessimism. Why did the 
Arab Spring turn into a ‘Jihadi Spring’? What were the weaknesses or the gaps that have 
given extremists the opportunity to emerge? The answers to these questions as well as 
the relationship linking radical Islamism to change and transition in the MENA region 
are addressed through comparative research and analysis.  
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The hypothesis this thesis explores is whether the radical manifestations of 
Islamism imbedded in the Arab political culture is fundamentally antithetical to an Arab 
democracy. As a counter argument, the Arab Spring is reexamined in light of Samuel 
Huntington’s theory of reverse waves. The confirmation of this hypothesis or its 
negation offers valuable insights as to the prerequisites for genuine democratic transition 
in the region.  
 
At an early stage, some scholars have homogeneously viewed the Arab Spring 
revolts without distinguishing between the protestors and their confronting opponents. 
Even though the activists shared a lot of similar ideas and tactics, the regimes they were 
trying to oust varied, and the contexts differed as well (Anderson, 2011). More than two 
hundred academic books and articles have been written about the Arab Spring; however, 
the writings are mostly descriptive rather than being methodical and linked to theories 
(Gevlin, 2012). There has been a swift shift from public unrest calling out for regime 
change into a rise of fanatic extremist groups. The change of events has appalled the 
international society and has turned the focus from the atrocities done by certain regimes 
onto those done by newly formed extremist groups. 
The infamous ISIS has exceptionally gained power in Syria among other Arab 
Spring countries. Many theorists state that radical movements usually take advantage of 
political or social vacuum, but that is not the case in the countries where regimes have 
been toppled. ISIS has been able to take control over rural and urban regions of Syria, 
which shows their political, military and social prowess (Caris and Reynolds, 2014). 
They govern through religious administrative offices and service offices. The former 
operates on enforcing religion and managing religious courts while the latter provides 
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the community with humanitarian aid and key infrastructure. It is puzzling that ISIS has 
managed to take control over parts of Syria where the Assad regime was still in power, 
rather than control areas in countries where regimes have been toppled. Unfortunately, 
the rise of ISIS has corresponded with the collapse of the Arab Spring. The international 
and the regional communities altered their focus from observing the fall of some 
autocratic Arab regimes onto the threat of ISIS.  
 
1.2 Syria’s Arab Spring 
Tunisia and Syria are two countries that have experienced the Arab Spring but 
have shown disparate results. In Syria, what started out as an uprising for regime change 
transformed into a ‘playground’ for extremist groups. The initial protests in Syria were 
similar to the counterpart’s movements across the region. Activists attempted to 
peacefully infiltrate public areas in Syria through a civic and non-Islamist connotation. 
The educated middle class represented a big portion of the protestors. They were 
counting on an international intervention similar to what occurred in Libya (Leenders & 
Heydemann, 2012). The peaceful approach did not last long in Syria. The movements 
escalated and conflicts developed between the army and the protestors, which gave way 
to an ongoing civil war (Leenders & Heydemann). The Assad regime offered several 
concessions during different intervals; however, they were considered insignificant by 
the protestors. Soon enough, the regime escalated its attack against the protestors and 
initiated a series of governmental crackdowns. The international society has been 
reluctant to take aggressive action in the Syrian conflict and has offered no outright 
intervention to stop the atrocities committed by the Assad regime.  
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The conflict was militarized and factions of the Syrian Sunni oppositions were 
backed by extremist groups and transformed the conflict into sectarian struggle. ISIS and 
al-Nusra Front have recently been major actors in the Syrian conflict. ISIS has gained 
ground as a result of the instability and lawlessness in Syria, has been able to take 
possession of heavy weaponry, and is now heavily funded by local businesses and a 
significant portion of the oil and gas sectors of Syria and Iraq (Knights, 2014). The 
emergence of ISIS has been a shock to governments and peoples across the world. It has 
developed from a fragment that broke off from al-Qaeda; its prime goal is to take over 
areas in Iraq and Syria to create an Islamic Sunni state. Past Iraqi soldiers have become 
ISIS fighters after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s military; the 2014 estimate of ISIS 
according to CIA is between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters in Syria and Iraq (CNN Library, 
2014). The international society’s inaction to the Assad Regime’s brutality has 
continued; however, once ISIS was taking over more areas in Syria and Iraq, the 
decision to intervene in Syria was finally taken.  
 
1.3 Tunisia’s Arab Spring   
 Tunisia, the catalyst of the Arab Spring, remains the only hope for a successful 
democratic transition. Many scholars seek to determine what factors, at least thus far, 
have led to the successful transition in Tunisia from the Zine El Abidine Bin Ali 
autocracy to the peaceful elections that favored its moderate Islamist political party, 
Annahda.  Is it the character and the structure of the Tunisian society or the absence of 
international intervention that have led to a peaceful and hopeful transition? The main 
reasons that have led to uprisings in Tunisia are: an authoritarian and corrupt 
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government, poor economic conditions and an educated population who wanted change 
(Hart, 2014). Ninety-eight percent of the Tunisians are Muslims and most of them are 
Sunni Muslims; similarly, Sunnis are the majority in Syria. Nevertheless, the moderate 
Islamists of Tunisia have learned the ‘art of compromise and consensus which maybe 
the trademark of the promising Tunisian political model’ (Gannoushi, 2014).  
Annahda’s political stances are not very Islamist and they don’t consider religion to be 
the main infrastructure behind policy-making. Since Tunisia’s independence, during the 
1950’s, leaders have been trying to secularize the country and they have excluded 
religion from all governmental spheres; however, the people in 2010 wanted the 
inclusion of pluralistic Islam in the public sphere. Tunisia was able to survive the 
turmoil raging around it, and it reached a national unity government. Annahda Party has 
proved capable of safeguarding the transition to democracy after years of exile in 
European capitals.  
The future challenges facing the Tunisians are: its geopolitical situation bordering Libya 
and its poor economic condition. The international community hasn’t interfered in the 
Tunisian matters during the uprisings. Unlike other Arab countries, the Tunisian military 
has had a minor part during the upheavals and it has also had a very minimalist role in 
the domestic economy (Anderson, 2011). 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 This thesis aims to shed the light on the aftermath of transition in two countries 
that have undergone the Arab Spring revolutions. The literature encompasses a number 
of articles and books that cover the different modes of transition; specifically revolutions 
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and counter-revolutions through the analysis of Samuel Huntington’s theory of reverse 
waves. It also highlights the requisites for democracy to be consolidated after any 
transition, and how Syria and Tunisia differ in that matter. Many scholars have discussed 
that Islam does not tolerate democracy; however, this matter is not the case in a number 
of several Islamic countries. 
The two main questions addressed in this thesis are as follows: 
• Do the transition indicators in Tunisia and Syria coincide with Huntington’s 
factors of reverse waves, and how tied are they to the core theories of successful 
transitions? 
• Is the rise of ISIS a representation of a reverse wave that Huntington discusses 
in his book The Third Wave?  
These questions are addressed through a comparative analysis between Syria, a 
failed transition, and Tunisia, a successful transition, on three levels of analysis and 
linked to Huntington’s theory of reverse waves.  
 
1.5 Methodology 
 In order to reveal characteristics of counter-wave and underlining causations as 
they relate to radical Islamism, a comparative research design is conducted so that the 
failed transition in Syria is compared to the relatively successful transition in Tunisia. 
Huntington’s Third Wave thesis and the qualifications for transition are incorporated in 
the comparative analysis in order to confirm that every attempted democratization is 
followed by a counter wave which, in turn, is represented by the upsurge of radical 
Islamism in Syria. 
7!!
 Even though there are various Islamist groups such as that of “Bayt Al Makdiss”, 
Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, Ansar Allah, and Kataab Ahl Al Hak, the focus is primarily 
on ISIS, as a radical rejectionist, and Annahda Party, as a moderate Islamist group, in 
order to compare approaches and attitudes towards transition as established by 
Huntington’s thesis. Examination is based on a preliminary desk study research that 
relies on political statements made by “rejectionists” against transitions (qualifications 
established by Huntington’s categories of reverse wave). 
 This paper primarily tackles the cases of Syria and Tunisia in light of the Arab 
Spring by comparing and analyzing them through the lens of a number of possible 
hypotheses. Three suggested propositions affecting the sequence of events result in the 
emergence of sectarian extremists. The first proposition deals with local governments 
and powers in each country respectively. It discusses the interaction between the 
autocratic structures of the local regimes with internal opposition. Locally, the levels of 
comparison also tackle the mode of transition, the requisites of democracy and the ethnic 
structure in each country that leads to the emergence of a differing sectarian dynamics in 
the MENA region. The second proposition reflects upon the regional theories that 
include the regional powers; mainly Iran, Turkey and the Saudi Arabia. This section 
covers the struggle and the interaction of these powers to shape the region and influence 
it according to their own interests. The third proposition is the effect of the international 
crisis on the respective countries. Global governance is collapsing and new international 
powers are emerging. This issue is affecting the interference of external actors in 
regional matters which, in turn, is affecting the sequence of events. A comparative 
8!!
research is drawn in order to show how the international actors have affected each case 
differently. 
 The analysis settles a variety of burning questions. First, it responds to whether 
the Arab Spring confirms Huntington’s propositions and his theory continues to provide 
a working model for democratic transition, or whether it must be revised. Second, this 
research reveals exceptional aspects of Islamist rejectionism and emerging sectarian 
dynamics that must be addressed and integrated in any theoretical proposition for 
change.  Third, it has the prospect of shedding light on an emerging governing crisis 
whose tenants stretch beyond simplistic egalitarianism or majoritarianism towards an 
emerging communitarian governing anomaly.  
The paper goes over each country separately and studies all of the variables mentioned 
above (levels of international intervention, levels of democracy requisites, mode of 
transition, regional powers, local governments, etc…), and a comparative table is formed 
to represent the implications of the study. 
 A set of preconditions are formed to show what might have led to sectarian 
extremism backed up by Huntington’s reverse wave factors. Radical Islamism is not the 
factor behind the hindrance of democracy in Arab countries; however, it is the 
combination of internal and external factors that lead to the failure of democracy and the 
attraction of radicalism as a means of protection and economic security. 
 
1.6 Map of Thesis 
The thesis is divided into five chapters: 
9!!
The first chapter introduces the main hypothesis under study and the research questions 
that are tackled. It also presents the method in which these questions are answered.  
The second chapter includes supporting literature that discusses the different forms of 
democratic transitions, stressing on the revolutionary transitions and their counter waves 
through the lens of Samuel Huntington. It also includes previous writings about Islam 
and its compatibility with democracy in the MENA region; as well as scholarly works 
on the requisites needed for democracy to be consolidated after a transition. 
The third chapter introduces the methodology that is used in this paper, which is a 
comparative analysis based on three propositions (international governance, regional 
power, and local stipulations), and how each is represented in both of Syria and Tunisia.  
Chapter four covers the analysis that links the three variables in both countries to 
Huntington’s explanations behind reverse waves. This chapter employs the analysis to 
infer the emerging sectarian dynamics and the governance struggle in the region. 
Chapter five attempts to outline the robust arguments that back the hypothesis, and it 
also suggests further research that reinforces the concluded hypothesis.  
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Analysis 
 
2.1 Democratic Transitions 
  The modes of democratic transitions have been an important study among 
political scientists. Even after three decades of research and theory generation, there is 
still no consensus on how to classify countries into the different modes, the 
consequences of the transitions, the selection of institutional configuration, and the 
consolidation of democracy (Schneider, 2006). Scholars have tried to study the different 
modes of transition to find common results that might demonstrate the most favoring 
mode for the consolidation of democracy. Nevertheless, as we will later see, the mode of 
transition is not the only aspect that reflects the success of a transition. There are a lot of 
other factors that add up to the transition equation.  
The main focus of this paper is to reveal the causes of reverse waves and interpret modes 
of counter transitions reinforced through Huntington’s theories. Each mode of transition 
is discussed briefly with the respective possible effects. A comparative research is drawn 
between Syria and Tunisia – two countries that have had a peaceful uprising, initially, 
but which have later demonstrated differing outcomes. Through this comparison, 
indicators of counter transitions are highlighted along with their underlining causes.  
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 The literature incorporated in this paper briefly covers the different modes of 
democratic transitions, the backlash of democratic revolutions and the prerequisites of 
democracy. It also touches on democracy and Islam by stressing the fact that radical 
Islamism is a by-product of the reverse wave in Syria, and it does not represent the 
inevitable doom of the Arab countries as claimed by some scholars.  
2.2 Modes of Transition 
 Defining ‘transition’ has been debatable among political scientists. O’Donnell and 
Schmitter have explained transition as the period between one political regime and 
another (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Nevertheless, transitions from authoritarian rule 
might not always lead to democracy (Karl & Schmitter, 2002). Transitions are divided 
upon three main stages: the first includes the dissolution of the authoritarian regime, the 
second tackles the installation of democracy, and the third incorporates the consolidation 
of democracy. O’Donnel distinguishes two periods of transition: the demise of the 
authoritarian regime and  the transition to consolidated democracy. The first period is 
often recognized with the first gestures of mass mobilization through the polarization of 
the main political actors. The various modes of transition are distinguished through 
examining the political actors who instigated the transition. The strength of these actors 
and their level of social consolidation influence the transition (Schneider, 2006).  
 
 Karl and Schmitter classify the modes of transition into four different categories: 
pacts, impositions, reform, and revolution. The first two classifications are dominated by 
elites: pacts through compromise and impositions through unilateral force. On the other 
hand, reform occurs via mass mobilization without the use of force, and revolution takes 
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place when the masses ‘rise up in arms’ to change the regime (Karl & Schmitter). 
Scholars have considered ‘pacts’ as the most effective among the different forms. 
O’Donnell/ Schmitter define pacts as 
“[...] an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, 
agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define 
(or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power in 
the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interest’ of those 
entering into it.”  
 
This statement explains why pacts have shown to be more successful than other modes 
of transition. They compromise the important political actors who are dependent on each 
other, and they work together on agreeing on the set of adjustments that the new regime 
needs to deploy, as shown in Table 1 (Welsh, 1994). The negotiating actors in a pact 
should also include the interests of social actors who are not active in the transition. This 
point is important for the pact during the period of consolidating democracy. The future 
of democracy depends on whether all social groups are on the same page regarding the 
democratic process. Transitions, regardless of the mode, need to tackle various crucial 
matters within time constraints. The institutional arrangements and the distribution of 
power need to be addressed and agreed upon by the main actors so that the second phase 
of the transition is reinforced (Welsh, 1994).  
Nonetheless, even if the actors agreed on the set of economic and political reforms, the 
sequence of events leading to these reforms might vary significantly. There is a high 
level of uncertainty concerning the process and the results. The demise of the 
authoritarian rule may give rise to different consequences, especially if there were signs 
of governmental instability, obstacles in decision-making and eruption of violent 
protests. Both, Syria and Tunisia, had the same mode of transition, but the outcomes 
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were different in each country. The mass mobilization that initiated in both countries had 
similar interests and needs. The primary demands were: overthrowing the autocratic 
regimes and the need for political and economic reform. According to a study done by 
Carsten Schneider in 2006, different modes of transitions may result in similar 
outcomes, and, sometimes, the same mode of transition may lead to differing outcomes 
(Schneider, 2006).  
Table&1&Transition&Processes&in&Central&and&Eastern&Europe:&Main&Issues&of&Conflict&Resolution&
Political Reform Economic Reform 
-Reform of electoral system -Macroeconomic stabilization (e.g., reform of 
monetary and fiscal policies) 
-Reform of structure of government (including 
issues of decentralization) 
-Price reform (e.g., price liberalization, currency 
convertibility) 
-Selection of new political elite -Structural reform (e.g., privatization, trade 
liberalization) 
-Development of institutions of interest articulation 
and interest aggregation (e.g., political parties, 
interest groups) 
-Institutional reform (e.g., reform of legal and 
banking systems) 
-Constitution writing -Education reform (e.g., management training) 
-Prosecution and purge of communist party 
officials and member of security apparatus 
 
-Restitution of past injustices  
-Reform of media sector  
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2.3 Requisites of Democracy 
An immense fraction of recent literature covers the fundamental causes of democratic 
transitions that have been hard to predict by theorists (Berg, 2013). Economic inequality 
has been a main cause for a democratic transition as studied in comparative politics and 
political economy. Nevertheless, the empirical studies do not give a strong backing to 
the proposed relationship between economic inequality and democratization (Berg). 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s economic theory of democratization states that the increase 
of economic inequality leads to the increase in the possibility for citizen mobilization to 
democratize.  
On the other hand, modernization theorists, such as Lipset, argue the opposite; the latter 
claims that economic development stimulates democratic transitions. Lispet is one of a 
number of scholars who try to identify the requisites of democracy. He cites Germany as 
an example of a country that has had a high level of education, wealth, industrialization 
and urbanization. These factors are considered by some to be favoring democracy; yet, 
Germany could not sustain democracy (Lipset, 1959). Lipset argues that ‘unique events’ 
in some countries might assist in either the perseverance or the collapse of democracy. 
Therefore, scholars have different perspectives regarding the set of requisites that favor 
democracy.  
 An essential requisite of democracy is a culture that accepts the democratic 
notions- freedom of speech, media, religion and human rights (Lipset, 1994). These 
notions cannot be abruptly created, and that is the reason why many past upheavals have 
failed to secure a democratic shift. Some of the examples of upheavals that have failed 
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are the French Revolution in 1789, the Russian Revolution in 1917 and most of the new 
states of Latin America in the 19th century. In most countries the institutionalization of 
democracy has occurred progressively through a give and take politics (Sklar, 1987). 
Moreover, as Lipset argues, the different groups in a state, whether religious, class, 
professional or economic, need to develop tolerance and recognize each others’ rights. 
The contesting factions in a society have learnt across history that they cannot eradicate 
a whole social group; hence, granting rights to a specific group might lessen the 
probability of a future upheaval against the more powerful faction (Lipset, Trow, and 
Coleman, 1956). Comparative politics proposes that for democracy to be 
institutionalized there needs to be power decentralization. In other words, democracy fits 
best when politics and economy are under separate management.  
 Another requisite that numerous political scientists have regarded as major is 
economy. Theorists have claimed that industrial capitalism supports and sustains 
democracy because it creates a middle class that can stand up against the state 
(Schumpeter, 1950). Other scholars as Weber, Moore, Skocpol and Berger have 
concluded that capitalism, even though it is not enough, is a primary condition for 
democracy. Nevertheless, there are some capitalist states that are not democratic (Latin 
America), and Waisman (1992) explains this notion by stating that a strong market 
economy is essential, and that private ownership of means of production is not enough.  
The market economy usually assists in the transformation of the class structure, and it 
strengthens the middle and the working classes. The working class is the faction of the 
society that pushes for suffrage and for accomplishing the rights of parties (Therborn, 
1977). Once there is a strong market economy, the influence of nepotistic networks is 
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hindered and there is less opportunity for ‘rent-seeking by elites with privileged access 
to state power and resources’ (Lipset, 1994). Hence, the less the state has to do with the 
economy, the better the possibility for a stronger democracy.   
 The third aspect that affects democracy is religion. Economy and democratic 
culture are essential prerequisites for the establishment of democracy; however, religion 
can be a constraint. Across history, the relationships between different religious groups 
and democracy have not been successful. Protestantism is a religious faction that has 
shown better acceptance for democracy. European Protestant countries have turned into 
democracies on a bigger scale than Catholic countries (Huntington, 1991). In Catholic 
countries, the church has adhered to the state and has imposed it hierarchical structure on 
the state. Furthermore, Catholics are considered to be authoritarian in spiritual matters, 
which highly affected the state (Trudeau, 1960). On the other hand, Protestants have 
been more congregational, participatory and individualistic – traits that contribute to the 
sustenance of democracy.  
Lipset (1994) also mentions Islamic countries in Central Asia, explaining that 
these states are farthest from democracy in comparison to past communist states. Even 
with the growth of capitalism and increased wealth and education, these states have not 
been democratized yet. Lipset argues that the cultural changes in those countries are not 
established yet to undertake a democratic change. This statement has been challenged by 
the Arab Spring upheavals which demonstrate that there are factions in those societies 
wanting democracy and are educated enough to request a change in the systems.  
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The level and the type of education in a country also have a considerable effect 
on the rise of democracy. When citizens have access to education and exposure to 
democratic notions, either through college or through basic reading and researching, 
they acquire a clearer consciousness of their political rights. As Bryce states, “education, 
if it does not make men good citizens, makes it at least easier for them to become so” 
(Byrce, 1912). Education strengthens the ‘culture requisite,’ and if it is faced with a 
weak economy and high unemployment, revolts are bound to happen (Campante & 
Chor, 2012).  
 
2.4 Social Movements Vs. Democratization 
Democratization theorists have allocated a minimal role to social movements and 
protest in the democratization process. The studies of the process of democratization 
started after World War II in Europe during the expansion of the USSR. The main focus 
of political scientists was to determine the prerequisites needed for democracy to 
develop and persist, as well as to define which social class has the main effect on 
sustaining democracy (Della Porta & Rossi, 2015).  
Scholars have given more regard to the structural conditions of social classes rather than 
their mobilization in the process of democratization. Social movements are considered to 
be short-lived actors compared to institutional actors, especially during the transition and 
the consolidation of democracy. The social movements differ in the various stages of 
democratization and have different effects on the process. Some are considered ‘the 
underground networks of resistance,’ and they challenge internal and international 
18!!
supports for the authoritarian regimes. Also, some social movements are associated with 
political parties and actors in democracy coalitions during the transitional phase. 
Nonetheless, these movements haven’t always been effective. There are numerous 
aspects that assist in democratization, and there needs to be a combination from above 
and from below. According to Pagnucco, the mode of transition, the background of the 
democratization process coupled with the actors involved and their “strategic 
interactions”, affect the type of democracy to be established (Pagnucco, 1995).  
Considering that ‘social movements’ go under the categories of ‘revolutions,’ we 
primarily need to define the precise concept of a revolution. As Peter Calvert states in 
his book Revolution and Counter-Revolution, the French Revolution has ‘set a 
permanent seal on the term (Calvert, 1990). Calvert also refers to Robertson who defines 
revolution as ‘a violent and total change in a political system’ that changes the 
distribution of power and social structure. The change must be purposeful, intentional 
and violent, and done by a class that leads the mobilized masses against the existing 
regime (Robertson, 1986). However, two of the case studies that Robertson mentions –
Russian and French Revolutions – do not fit the description he states. The French 
Revolution was not intentional, and the Russian Revolution did not lead the masses 
against the regime. 
Other scholars have tried to define the term revolution by stating what it is not. Giddens 
states that a revolution is not a coup d’état, which only replaces one set of leaders by 
another (Giddens, 1989). He argues that a revolution needs to be achieved by a mass 
social movement with the threat or use of violence. This definition contradicts with the 
classification of the Russian Revolution because the latter was not a result of mass 
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mobilization. On the other hand, the definition classifies Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 
as a revolution because he was able to reach the greater power by violence and, most 
importantly, by being backed up by the mass movement from the beginning (Calvert, 
1990). Hence, the definition of ‘revolution’ is a broad definition that encompasses a lot 
of varying phenomena. There are specific characteristics that are common to the varying 
definitions of revolution: 
-Revolution is sudden and it is not a gradual transformation. 
-Revolution is violent. Even though some political systems rely on the use of force by 
possessing the monopoly of use of physical coercion, but revolutions’ use of coercion is 
essential and not a last resort.  
-Revolution is political succession through the substitution of the present regime by 
another. Therefore, any failed attempt to change the regime is not considered a 
revolution. 
-Revolution is change. There has not been a consensus on the set of changes that occur 
after a revolution which make revolution ‘an essentially contested concept’ (Gallie, 
1956). 
Samuel Huntington outlined two types of revolutions depending on the type of the 
regime in charge before the revolution. The first form is the Western revolutions (France 
and Russia) where the regimes are weak and traditional monarchies collapse after the 
slight use of force against them. After the fall of the regime, a contention occurs between 
the moderates and the radicals, and the result of this contention defines the scope of the 
change. The second form is Eastern revolutions (China and Vietnam) that occur in more 
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modernizing type of governments. The use of force to overthrow the regime is much 
higher in this form because such regimes are usually robust. Therefore, the first variable 
that Huntington presents is the type of regime. There is also a second variable that 
affects the outcome of the revolutions, and it is the type of society (Dix, 1983). 
Additional factors influence the process of the revolution, such as the terrain, the 
bordering countries and external intervention. Dix uses a simplified typology (Table 2) 
to show the types of revolutions. He refers to two additional types of revolutions where 
one has a semi-modern society and regime (Latin American Revolutions), and another in 
which the regime is traditional while the society is semi-modern.  
 Democracy and revolution are contrasted in history and political science; they 
are also generally considered opposed practices. As mentioned before, scholars do not 
regard revolutions as strong impetuses for democracy, but some revolutions are done in 
‘service of a democratic impulse’ (Hutchinson & Colon-Rios, 2013). When the citizens 
have no political and legal means in changing the order in their country, they resort to 
violent and disorganized exercise of constituent power, which is presented through 
revolutionary conduct. This matter represents an untamed practice of the democratic 
instinct.  
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Table&2;&Types&of&Revolutions&
Note. Adapted from The Varieties of Revolution, p. 290, by R. H. Dix, 1983, Comparative Politics, City of 
New York. 
 
2.5 Counter Revolutions: Huntington’s Theory of Reverse Waves 
 The main focus of the comparative analysis is based on the backlash of revolutions 
and its effect on the Arab Spring. Samuel P. Huntington is the scholar who has primarily 
introduced the idea that democratization occurs through waves that, in turn, occur when 
a number of countries tend to democratize in parallel space and time – as a cluster.  
When it comes to democratic transitions, he argues that “democratic regimes that last 
have seldom, if ever, been instituted by mass popular action. Almost always, democracy 
has come as much from the top down as from the bottom up; it is as likely to be the 
product of oligarchy as of protest against oligarchy” (Huntington, 1984). It was the 
lower and the middle class citizens who generated the Arab Spring upheavals. The 
protests have started in a peaceful manner but ended violently in most countries. 
Political scientists have considered these events to be the spark of a democratic 
transition to end the long-ruling authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, the positivity 
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shown at first has reached a halt with the emergence of extremist sectarian groups. It 
reminds us of Huntington’s reverse waves: overthrowing authoritarian rulers only to 
subsequently struggle against sectarian extremists who have risen with the spread of 
chaos, specifically in Syria. The applicable cliché for almost all revolutions is that every 
revolution has a related counterrevolution (Nafi, 2014). The upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, 
and Libya have succeeded in overthrowing their governments; Syria and Yemen are still 
trying to do the same. However, all these countries have not prepared themselves to face 
the counterrevolutionary waves (Nafi).  
 
 In order to study whether the Arab Spring is a representation of the development of 
the third wave of democratization, we should first observe Huntington’s wave theory 
and the factors that lead to a wave or its reverse. According to Huntington, every wave 
of democratization has been followed by a ‘reverse wave’. The first wave started in the 
1820’s and continued for almost a century. Twenty-nine democracies have formed over 
the years. The corresponding reverse wave has been initiated by Mussolini’s reign over 
Italy in 1922, which was followed by a decrease in democracies to 12 countries by the 
year 1942. The second wave of democratization began after World War II, and its 
reverse wave followed by decreasing the democracies from 36 to 30 countries around 
the world (Huntington, 1991). Huntington argues that social scientists cannot give an 
answer to how far we are in the third wave and whether there will be a third reverse 
wave. Nevertheless, he states the factors that might affect the democratic expansion or 
contraction. The five major factors that assist in democratic expansion according to 
Huntington are as follows:  
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1) Authoritarian regimes are facing difficulty in legitimizing their rule where citizens are 
open to democratic values and are going through profound economic instabilities; 
2) The economic advancement during the 1960s has led to the expansion of the middle 
classes in a lot of countries; 
3) The change in the Catholic Church activities from protecting authoritarianism to 
opposing it; 
4) Changes in the policies of external actors; 
5) The snowballing effect which has occurred earlier during the third wave. 
 
    Huntington supports these factors by historical events. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
many Catholic countries have democratized in Europe, Central America, and South 
America. The European Union was a reason why Spain, Greece, and Portugal have 
democratized since their democratization has secured their membership to the EU. 
Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union gave the opportunity to democratize to many 
countries in Eastern Europe. The EU and the Soviet Union are both considered external 
actors that have respectively affected the democratic transitions in a number of 
countries. Huntington also mentions the United States’ major role in promoting 
democracy – which is still the case as we see in a lot of countries (Check figure 1-
showing the global levels of democracy). 
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  Note. Adapted from The Third Wave of Democratization in the Late 20th century, by S. P. 
                         Huntington, 1991, Norman, OK and London, University of Oklahoma Press. 
 
 
 Scholars have challenged Huntington’s wave theory by stating that even after thirty 
years of the start of the third wave, Arab countries are still ruled by authoritarian 
regimes. In the 1970’s, some Arab countries have tried to establish major reforms in 
order to strengthen popular participation in governance. Egypt started the reform in 1973 
and renewed its promise to reform after the assassination of Anwar Sadat. In Morocco, 
King Hassan II also resorted to some type of liberalization in order to prevent his 
demise. He allowed the participation of a few political parties and held municipal and 
parliamentary elections in 1976 and 1977. Likewise, Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, and 
Turkey renewed their party systems and elections in 1980s. Yet, despite all the intended 
change that the regimes tried to perform, there was no significant liberalization in any of 
those countries (Lust, 2011). It is only until 2011 that Arab societies took action on the 
streets to cease the long period of autocracy. After the uprisings in Tunisia, scholars 
have rehashed the study of democratization in the Arab world. The primary impression 
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on the Arab Spring was that the third democratization wave has been revived by the 
upheavals. The world was anxiously waiting to see the long-lived authoritarian regimes 
fall from their reign. The factors that support democratization waves, which Huntington 
discusses, can be linked to the Arab Spring upheavals. In her article, Missing the Third 
Wave (2011), Lust states some of the reasons that have been behind the delay of the third 
wave of democratization in the Arab region. She argues that the fear of political Islam 
has been used by the authoritarian Arab regimes to crush any civil or political liberties. 
The 1970’s experience that the secularist democrats have had with Islamists has led the 
democratic civil societies to rationalize that they are better off with the enemy they knew 
(autocratic regime). This matter has increased the gap between Islamists and secular 
democrats, leaving the arena for the regime to enhance its control. The relationship 
between radical and moderate factions in the opposition influences the probability of a 
successful democratic transition. In addition, the increased strength of radical forces 
might result in the hindrance of transition. Lust argues that the exclusion of Islamists 
from the political sphere might be a reason behind their resort to militant radicalism 
(Lust, 2011). In 2011, the fear of Islamists did not thwart the people from revolting and 
starting the Arab Spring. In Egypt and Morocco, Islamists and secularists have been 
cooperating for a long period before the Arab Spring. The fear and uncertainty has been 
reduced between both groups, and this issue has been revealed in the way they joined 
forces to call for greater democratization during the Arab Spring upheavals.  
 
 Nevertheless, two years after the protests started, the fear of Islamic radicals, which 
the regimes have used for their own benefit in the past, have eventually surmounted. In 
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Syria, a new form of reverse wave has appeared. What is unique about Syria is that the 
shift is occurring from an authoritarian regime to a more extremist and authoritarian 
power. If we compare the reasons of reverse waves that Huntington mentions to the 
Syrian situation, we can actually find a lot of similarities; that is the reason why the rise 
of ISIS can actually be presented as a form of reverse wave. Huntington’s reasons 
behind reverse waves are as follows: 
 
1) The democratic values among the elite groups and the public were not strong enough; 
2) Rigorous economic downfalls deepened social conflict and opened the path for 
solutions that can only be imposed by authoritarian governments; 
3) Social and political divisions caused by leftist governments required swift social and 
economic reforms; 
4) The middle and upper classes’ willpower to exclude populist and lower class groups 
from political power; 
5) The collapse of law and order (anarchy) resulting from terrorism or revolution; 
6) Intervention of an external nondemocratic power; 
7) “Reverse snowballing” set off by the collapse of a democratic system in another 
country. 
 
The democratic values in both of Syria have not been strong since the educational system 
and the long period of political oppression has weakened the basis of a democratic 
culture. On the other hand, the Annahdha Party activists in Tunisia have gained back the 
democratic education during their exile in European capitals. Comparing the above 
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factors to the occurrences in the countries under study shows that radical Islamism is not 
the major factor that resulted in the failure of democratic transition; however, it is the 
combination of internal and external factors that hindered the creation and the sustenance 
of democracy.  Henceforth, the beginning of the Arab Spring represents the Arab Third 
Wave of democratization that is directly followed by an exceptional reverse wave in 
Syria and Iraq – in hopes that it does not stabilize and spread to other regions.  
Moreover, the number of democratic nations around the world has been declining, and 
many scholars are questioning if ‘democracy is in decline’. The Freedom House has been 
generating reports that show the level of democracy decreasing in a number of countries. 
Has the third reverse wave already started? After the invasion of Iraq and Russia’s return 
to authoritarianism, political scientists’ optimism in democracy has been decreasing. 
However, the recent decrease is as immense as Huntington’s reverse waves. It is rather 
referred to as a period of ‘stagnation’. Francis Fukuyama has mentioned in his writings 
that there is need for strong governance that would assist in consolidating democracy. 
Hence, the failure of new democracies has been a result of ‘bad governance’ (Fukuyama 
et al., 2015). The failure of governance is shown is economic downfalls, weak public 
services, and corruption. Plattner discusses three reasons behind the decline of 
democracy: the first being presented by the weak economic and political performance of 
advanced democracies. The second is the ‘new self-confidence of some authoritarian 
regimes and the third is the shifting geopolitical balance between democracies and their 
rivals’ (Plattner, 2015). There was an increase of unemployment after the financial crisis 
in 2005 that has faced advanced democracies. On the other hand, economy, in countries 
where real democracy is still absent (as in China, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia) has been 
advancing significantly. Unfortunately, the Journal of Democracy has recently published 
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a series of articles concerning the resurgence of authoritarianism, which reveal cases 
where authoritarian countries have been more successful in using soft power compared to 
advanced democracies. The geopolitical change in the international arena has had a lot of 
influence on domestic politics of small states, especially after the United States has been 
in “a state of retrenchment” (Kagan, 2012). This change has been apparent through the 
rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and through Russia’s incursion in eastern Ukraine. These 
events put the democratic ideals in a vulnerable and exposed state that might alter the 
rules of the game. Nevertheless, the future of this struggle is still in the creation, which 
will be a focus of study for political scientists.  
 
2.6 Political Islam and the Arab Spring   
 As previously mentioned, religion can be an obstacle to the formation of democracy. 
Islam and politics in the MENA have been a unique phenomenon that scholars have been 
extensively studying for a long time. The use of religion for political means has been 
growing even though scholars of religion and ethnicity have predicted (early mid-20th 
century) that modernization through the industrial revolution and interdependence in 
world economics will lead to the secularization of societies (Sisk, 1992). Nevertheless, 
we can perceive during our era that societies in the MENA region have been resilient to 
change. Scholars have referred to this case as the Middle East Exceptionalism (Bellin, 
2004). But strangely enough, most of the autocratic countries (Syria, Egypt, 
Tunisia...etc.) have suppressed the Islamic political groups and, at times, have used 
violence against them. There are other countries of the MENA that used religion as their 
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basic legal statute (Saudi Arabia, Emirates, Qatar…etc.). In this section we only regard 
the role of Islam in the establishment – or combating – of democracies. 
 The debate on the relationship between Islam and democracy is quite controversial. 
According to Sisk (1992), the view on religious political action is founded on two 
misleading principles: 
1) ‘Religion is inherently antimodern,’ and that it is always fundamentalist. 
2) Because of religion’s fundamentalist characteristic, religious political action is always 
antidemocratic. 
Religion does not always resist the rise of democracy; it can rather be a stimulant (Weber, 
1905). As previously mentioned, Weber’s work has shown that some characteristics in 
Protestantism have had positive effects on the rise of modern capitalism. This deduction 
negates the first principle. On the other hand, certain English and American puritans 
assisted in the growth of modern democratic societies, and many American religious 
groups have participated in antislavery and civil rights movements. Not to forget the 
religiously oriented reform led by Martin Luther King, Jr. that helped improve 
democratic aims. These religious political actions are not antidemocratic as generally 
presumed (Little, 1990). Hence, the second principle is also invalid. 
It is common in public discourse to use the term ‘fundamentalism’ while referring to 
Islam. It puts a label on the entire religious tradition; yet, the term ‘fundamentalism’ has 
originally appeared as a description of the state of religious believers in the 1920s in 
America, the ‘militantly antimodern Protestant evangelicals’ (Sisk, 1992). The term was 
used to denote rejection to liberalism and modern science even though those 
fundamentalist groups have used resources of modern science to develop a social and 
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political plan. According to the Chicago Fundamentalism Project, fundamentalism does 
not denote a fixed concept, and it does not always proclaim the infallibility of holy texts. 
It is a reactionary move concerned with basic fundamentals of a religious tradition that is 
devoted to absolute truth. A fundamentalist views himself as a mediator of the holy 
power with a force that gives life to the group (Marty, 1988). Therefore, fundamentalism 
should not label a whole religion, but only that specific group that has the characteristics 
of fundamentalism. As Sisk states, “While there may be a phenomenon which can be 
appropriately termed Islamic fundamentalism, all Muslims are certainly not 
fundamentalists” (Sisk, 1992, p.7).  
  In spite of the democratic prospect that the Arab Spring posed, it also presented a 
difficult historical episode in the course of Islamist movements. Islamists were abruptly 
placed into a revolutionary plot that they were not prepared for. The Islamist 
organizations played a minimal role in the primary mass mobilizations in Egypt, Tunisia, 
Syria and Libya. Initially, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt refrained from endorsing the 
protests scheduled for January 25, 2011 until they changed their decision three days after. 
Nevertheless, in Syria and Tunisia, Islamist groups have been extremely repressed, 
imprisoned or exiled, and it made it hard for Islamist leaders in those countries to call 
their supporters into the streets (Al-Arian, 2015). The opportunity for Islamists emerged 
after the mass mobilizations and during the political transitions in countries where the 
regimes fell. On the other hand, the Islamists of countries with failed transitions were 
represented by extremist groups that capitalized on the anarchy, such as ISIS and Al-
Nusra Front in Syria.   
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 According to Gerges, it is still early to provide a clear verdict on how Islamists will 
govern and whether they will show tolerance and moderation. The Islamists of Tunisia 
have shown to be the most moderate amongst other Islamists groups. However, as Gerges 
claims, a pattern can be indicated through the governance of Islamists during the past 
three decades. There is an obvious shift towards pragmatism, which opens the field for 
open-minded and reformist technocrats (Gerges, 2014). Islamists appeared to be more 
willing to form coalitions with ideological opponents who are non-Muslim. This has 
occurred in Tunisia, where the Annahda Party formed coalitions with liberals and 
secularists rather than joining in with highly conservative Salafis. Nevertheless, the 
direction of Islamists depends on the aftermath of the political struggles and on the status 
of the transition.  
 Hence, depending on the political interests, some Islamist groups are willing to enter 
into coalitions with liberal political groups and Western powers. The different types of 
political Islam will be presented in the two case studies in the following chapter. Most of 
the Islamists in Tunisia, represented by Annahda Part, have been showing great 
moderation since the start of the uprising and even after the arrival of Gannouchi. 
Nevertheless, most of the Islamists in Syria are showing extremism and unprecedented 
radicalism. Political Islam cannot be tied to conservatism only for there are Islamist 
groups that are politically active and they show moderation in their stances and choices. 
Each Islamist group that has been active in the Arab Spring countries shows a different 
attitude towards future governance, and this depends on the unique background and 
historical experiences each group has (Gerges, 2014).   
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2.7 Contending Waves in the Arab Spring 
 The literature incorporated in this chapter is used to frame and link the 
comparison between each country. The differing modes of transition have been 
generally discussed to give a glimpse of the scholarly writings on transition forms. 
Commonly, it has been indicated that pacts are the most favorable mode for democracy 
to be consolidated. Yet, a certain mode of transition might lead to different outcomes in 
two different countries. The same seems to have happened in Syria and Tunisia where 
the transition in both countries was through mass mobilization; however, the outcomes 
were very different. In Tunisia, the transition so far appears to be progressive compared 
to Syria, where the protests turned into conflicts between different factions, and radical 
Islamism profited from the spread of chaos. 
Every transition depends on democracy requisites that might not, in turn, 
guarantee democracy. Scholars have tried to determine the basic pillars in a country that 
will insure a transition to democracy. Three main components were generally agreed 
upon: high levels of education, receiving culture and liberalized economy. Nevertheless, 
across history, some countries have had all components, but democracy has yet to be 
consolidated. In the following chapter, the political, economic and cultural structures of 
both countries are compared (local level). The comparison also tackles the regional and 
international spectra related to both countries to ensure the coverage of most aspects and 
factors that have led to the differing outcomes. The waves’ theory is employed in the 
analysis where the factors that Huntington stated to be behind democratization waves are 
found in both countries (Syria and Turkey); however, the factors behind reverse waves 
reflect only on the Syrian case, which helps us infer that the rise of radical Islam is a 
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representation of a reverse wave and the emergence of conflictual sectarian dynamics. 
This inference is in contrast with the claim of numerous scholars that the Arab countries 
(Islamic countries) are inevitably antithetical to democracy. 
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Chapter Three 
Case Studies: Tunisia and Syria 
 
3.1 Overview of the Arab Spring 
The year 2010 represents a new episode of the Middle East and North Africa 
region. Upheavals started in Tunisia, spread over other Arab countries, and the principal 
demand among the protesters was a swift regime change. The Arab exceptionalism has 
been challenged by the rapid demise of long-lived authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Yemen and Libya. The world was shocked to see these events unravel at a fast 
pace, especially that political scientists were not able to predict any change in the region. 
On the contrary, scholars had given up on the MENA region’s capability to break the 
wall of authoritarianism and liberalize. As soon as the upheavals started, the hope of 
change has returned and scholars have referred to it as the ‘Arab Spring’. Nevertheless, 
spring was not the fate of all the countries. Only six Arab countries have been influenced 
by the snowballing effect of the upheavals, and four out of six resulted in regime change. 
The only country that seems to have attained a trace of democracy among them is 
Tunisia.  
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The media’s focus has primarily been on the political factors behind the 
upheavals. The main discussion has only tackled the political needs that have to do with 
the fall of the regimes and the rise of political freedom. Nevertheless, the core reasons 
that have led the masses to revolt are socio-economic. In an attempt to point out some 
common causes that have led to the Arab Spring, Hanafi mentions a number of socio-
economic and demographic factors. There was a major drop in the GDP per capita (3% 
to less than 0.3%) in a lot of Arab states. Moreover, the percentage of unemployment 
was more than 10% in most countries, and it reached 13% in Tunisia. Unemployment 
rate was a lot higher among the educated youth (above 20%) than the average population 
rate (around10%). Another factor that is discussed by Marktanner (2011) is the 
widespread inequality in the Arab societies; it has evidently risen since the late 1980s. 
Inequality was amplified after 2007, which was a turning point after the prices of food 
and fuel increased, making it hard to subsidize. As a result, the income inequality in the 
region has intensified in recent years (Hanafi, 2012).  
Even though the factors that have led to the upheavals were shared among the six 
countries, but according to Anderson, the “patterns and the demographics of the protests 
varied widely” (Anderson, 2011). Also, as previously mentioned, the consequences of 
the mass mobilizations have been reflected differently on each country. The Arab Spring 
countries shared similar authoritarian and corrupt leaders that controlled the 
governments through corruption. The citizens’ dissatisfaction grew with time and 
intensified with the economic crisis and high unemployment rates. Nonetheless, each 
regime structure is unique in each country, which has led to the different outcomes. 
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In this chapter, a comparison between Tunisia and Syria is developed upon three 
different strata. While the protests in Tunisia were successful in ousting Zine el-Abidine 
Ben Ali, the Syrian civilians are still facing outrageous attacks from the regime and 
other counterparts. The first level of comparison is based on the local arena of both 
countries, which tackles the regime structure and other political actors, the economy and 
the culture/education of the varying social classes in each country. The second basis of 
comparison will be grounded upon the regional power struggle between neighboring 
countries and their effect on Syria and Tunisia. The last field to be studied is the 
international power shift and how it relates differently to both countries.  
 
3.2 The Differing Aspects of Local Governance: Tunisia & Syria 
3.2.1 Bin Ali’s Regime 
Tunisia represents the spark of the Arab revolutions. In December 2010, the fruit 
vendor, Bouazizi, set himself on fire out of desperation caused by the extreme poverty 
coupled with governmental corruption. This incident was the main trigger that resulted 
in the spread of upheavals all over Tunisia, which later replicated in other Arab 
countries. The Tunisian president was first to fall in response to the protests against his 
long autocratic rule. The Tunisian army refused to use force against the protestors and 
the latter have shown that peaceful protests could eventually succeed. The country 
possessed a number of ingredients for a successful revolution; there is a long history of 
political activism, a resilient civil society, a worthy portion of educated and unarmed 
citizens, a neutral army and its involved and practical Islamist movement. The education 
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system in Tunisia was considered to be one of the best among other Arab countries. The 
country also had the largest middle class with a very strong labor movement. However, 
Bin Ali’s regime was keen on curbing freedom of expression and political parties. Bin 
Ali’s Tunisia was a police state where the latter functioned as the regime’s primary 
foundation of power to suppress internal opposition. He rose to power through the 
internal security system although he had a military background (Lutterbeck, 2013). He 
took command of the internal security forces and police before he became president, 
which assisted him later in toppling Bourguiba. Bin Ali’s main backbone was the police 
force that weighed a ratio of three to four times higher officers than the most policed 
countries in Europe. The police was used to monitor and suppress any possible 
oppositional activity in the country. The police force had committed widespread 
exploitative arrests that made them the most hated institution in Tunisia. It was not by 
chance that the police’s harassment was behind Bouazizi’s self-immolation.  
Ben Ali’s government had strict control over the media and suppressed freedom of 
expression. The communications’ infrastructure was quite developed in comparison to 
nearby countries; however, the citizens did not have an open access to the Internet and 
communications’ apparatus where the regime exercised persistent censorship. 
Nevertheless, under Bin Ali, elections were held regularly and the voter’s turnout 
increased by 12% from 1989 to 1999. In 1994, the opposition was able to enter the 
government for the first time in the country’s history. The ruling party still held 81% of 
parliament and political sphere (Table 3).  
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Table 3- Elections in Tunisia (1981-1999) 
 
 
 Note. Adapted from Political Liberalization in Bin Ali’s Tunisia, p. 129, by L. Sadiki, 2002, 
              Frank Cass, London. 
 Even though past elections have shown some improvement in the voter’s turnout 
and that there was small room for handpicked opposition, democracy was still deficient 
in Tunisia. Two reasons hindering democracy in Tunisia were argued to be nationalism 
and pragmatism (Sadiki, 2002). The regime used nationalism as a pretext to assure 
political uniformity. Hence, political plurality was inhibited through labeling the 
opposition with anti-nationalist forces (khawarij). The government had co-opted leftists, 
human rights activists and intellectuals who lack autonomous resources. Bin Ali used the 
quota system in the elections to make sure that the secular and trivial political parties are 
enlisted under ‘loyal opposition’ category. Yet, there had been a certain vocalized 
opposition through regime opponents. Monsef al-Marzouki, a leading human rights 
activist, was able to express his anti-regime views but suffered from regime harassment, 
which had him lose his professorship of medicine and his passport. Other opposition 
groups included Gannushi (the leader of Annahda Party), Tunisian Communist Workers’ 
Party and the Tunisian Human Rights League. The biggest threat to the regime was the 
Islamists (Annahda Party) whose members faced severe crackdown by being watched 
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and harassed and sometimes banned from traveling (Human Rights Watch, 2010). The 
regime was cautious in the ways it oppressed civil groups in order not to face 
international criticism. The government passed associations law that limited the activity 
of all risky civil society groups. The regime was able to suppress serious attempts from 
opposition groups until it was faced with a unique event (Bouazizi’s self-immolation) 
that led to its fall.  
 
3.2.2 Tunisia’s Economy Pre-Arab Spring 
 The second variable to be studied on the local arena is the economy. Tunisia’s 
major social welfare initiative (National Security Fund) had been controlled and taken 
over by the regime since 1990s. There was a huge inequality between the rural and the 
urban areas where the highly urbanized regions witnessed the bigger part of the 
country’s economic growth, but the rural western regions were left behind. The youth 
from the rural regions often migrate to the cities in search of jobs; however, they end up 
with low-paying and aggravating jobs. The educated portion of the youth encounter 
tougher times finding adequate jobs, and they usually end up unemployed (and hence 
increasing the unemployment rate). A number of reasons behind this economic 
inequality include the inadequate government investment, scarcity of natural resources, 
distribution of land, and the insufficient access to financial resources.  
 Three months before the start of the upheavals in Tunisia, the IMF published a 
report on Tunisia stating that the government had endured the global financial crisis that 
had struck the demand in the country’s major export market. Surprisingly enough, the 
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growth still reached 4.5 percent, and its debt-to-GDP ratio (43%) was almost half that of 
France (IMF, 2010). The report also mentions that there needs to be an increase in the 
sources of growth to decrease unemployment, which had been at a rate of 13.3, close to 
that of southern Europe. Considering Tunisia’s high level of poverty and instability, it 
was still considered as an economic success story and referred to as the ‘economic 
miracle’ (World Economic Forum, 2010). Nevertheless, the Tunisians were getting tired 
of the economic situation and bureaucracy they were facing. Institutions were highly 
corrupt, and underpaid civil servants used to take advantage of any chance they would 
get to receive a bribe (Noueihed & Warren, 2012). 
 By 2010, the illiteracy rate in Tunisia had dropped to 22 percent but the number 
of educated-unemployed youth doubled over the past ten years (Table 4). Oddly, the 
more educated the individual is the higher possibility for him/her to end up jobless. Most 
of the unemployed youth came from the interior and southern parts of Tunisia where the 
uprising started; the government has long been biased towards the coastal cities. In 
contrast to the IMF and the WEF reports, Tunisians perceived an increase in corruption 
and economic inequality during the last three years (before the mobilizations). 
   Table 4- Unemployment in Tunisia 
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3.2.3 Tunisia’s Islamists and Secular Society 
 
 After twenty-one years of exile, the leader of Annahda Party, Rachid 
Ghannouchi returned to his homeland overwhelmed by the crowds that waited to greet 
him. Men dressed in western outfits and women with headscarves were gathered in the 
parking and lobby of the airport. Simultaneously, a group of secularist and feminist 
activists were protesting against what they dreaded would be the consequence of 
Gannouchi’s return: the Islamization of Tunisia. They voiced their fears by yelling 
statements like ‘No Islamism, no theocracy, no sharia and no stupidity’. They did not 
want Gannouchi’s return to resemble that of Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. 
Nevertheless, the crowds waiting Gannouchi outnumbered those of the secularists’. The 
former tried to show a moderate representation of Islamists by holding banners saying 
‘Do not fear Islam’ and ‘No to extremism’ (Noueihid, 2011). Annahda members showed 
a great deal of organization and politeness, something that was not expected from a 
group that was suppressed or exiled since the 1980s. The party appeared to be the most 
popular and organized political force in the North African country, gaining 41.7 percent 
of the seats of the Tunisian assembly responsible for rewriting the constitution.  The 
secular parties that ran for elections were not as organized and mature. Instead of joining 
their efforts and uniting, they quarreled over who should lead the electoral list. The 
difference lied in the fact that secularist parties have suffered for a longer period under 
the rule of Bin Ali while most of Annahda members were in exile and received foreign 
support and financial aid (Bahloul, 2011).   
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 The Tunisian population is mostly Sunni Muslims with weak tribal loyalties, a 
less diverse population compared to Lebanon or Iraq (Noueihid & Warren, 2012). Yet, 
since independence, there has always been an internal argument about the role of 
religion in politics. This reality was reflected through the fear of the secularists groups in 
Tunisia after Bin Ali’s departure. However, what gives Tunisia a better position in 
comparison to other Arab countries is that its secular tradition is highly robust and was 
able to win 60 percent of the seats in the constituent assembly even without a single 
leading party. Let’s not forget the actions of Bourguiba who introduced Personal Status 
Code, abolishing polygamy and giving women rights in marriage and divorce. He also 
gave women the right to vote for the first time in municipal elections (1957).  
A lot of the progressive reforms introduced during Bourguiba’s rule were 
considered revolutionary. Many secular Tunisians today are a result of those reforms and 
they fear that Islamists take over. Ghannouchi was keen on silencing the fears of 
secularists, and his party did not run a candidate for the presidential election as a 
reassurance that they do not plan on declaring an Islamic state. They did not call for the 
abolishment of any of the past reforms or the liberal customs, and Ghannouchi stated 
that Annahda supports the creation of a pluralistic and democratic civil state. 
Nevertheless, secularists are still reluctant towards Annahda’s real intentions because 
they believe what Annahda states publicly is different from their real beliefs. Since the 
revolution, other Islamic groups have been surfacing on the Tunisian political sphere; 
some of them are Salafists that call for strict Islamic rule and, for the first time, women 
in niqab and men with long beards and short jalabiya robes are being spotted 
occasionally. Moreover, a number of attacks on outspoken secularists have been made 
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by Salfists. An extremist Islamist group (Hizb al-Tahrir) has been calling for the revival 
of the Islamic caliphate, but the government denied it a party license.  
3.2.4 Bashar’s Syria  
 The Arab Spring had enraged an unprecedented internal conflict, which resulted 
in the death of numerous civilians and displacement of around 4.3 million refugees. It is 
considered the ‘world’s largest humanitarian crisis since World War II’ (ECHO, 2015). 
The focus of this part is on the national political arena and actions of the regime before 
and during the conflict. The structure of the Syrian political regimes has been 
unchangeable since 1970s. The regime has long considered the middle class its only 
political competitor and possible alternative; therefore, the regime believes that it is 
important to neutralize the middle class and remove it from politics to guarantee the 
stability of the regime. The regime compensates the middle class economically and tries 
to grant it some authority through the state, making sure that they don’t establish an 
independent political role. Specifically after the death of Hafez al-Assad, the regime has 
used the economy to increase their social base by developing the interaction between the 
authority and Syrian bourgeoisie. This relation has formed a strong form of monopoly 
over the national resources and the main businesses in the country (Kilo, 2011). Hence, 
the regime has created a structure to control all social classes and to pacify any intended 
political repercussion. The Ba’ath regime has sustained its control employing three 
rudiments: the military-security complex, the Ba’ath party apparatus, and the Alawite 
elite. The security apparatus has the major role in forcefully silencing any social 
movement or change.  
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 Following the formation of this structure between the regime and the Syrian 
bourgeoisies (referred to as the Chinese model), the Syrian public sphere started to 
display constant demands for reform, and, for the first time, during the Ba’ath rule, those 
asking for reforms were united. This coincided with the death of the President of the 
Republic and the suicide of the Minister of the Interior in 2005. The regime, then, 
promised to take a set of reforms that were not implemented later. Tensions started to 
increase, and many scholars were awaiting an eruption in Syria during that period 
especially after the emergence of the information on revolution among the Syrian youth 
-which happen to represent 79% of the society (Kilo, 2011). Most of the Syrian youth 
had obtained adequate levels of education and could not find job opportunities and 
cannot even express themselves without being restricted by the security apparatus.  
 
3.2.5 Syria’s Economic Reform under Bashar 
 The ‘Chinese model’ adopted by Bashar liberalized the Syrian economy and 
ensured the regime’s control. He consulted western-educated technocrats to achieve the 
economic reform. Five years after Bashar’s rule, private banks and insurance companies 
were introduced in Syria after a long shut off. In 2009, the Syrian stock exchange started 
trading and was regarded as a success. Import taxes and trade limitations were lessened, 
which obviously changed the Syrian market into a more liberalized one with a lot of 
international shops and products. These reforms assisted in developing the tourism 
sector that provided 13 percent of the jobs in Syria by 2010. The real estate business 
flourished as well especially after the influx of Iraqi migrants. Property prices were 
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increasing with the high demand, which opened the door for wealthy investors and 
businessmen. 
Nevertheless, the development resulting from the reform has advantaged the 
nouveau riche elite who have strong relations with the regime. Most of the leading 
business families are related in one form or another to the Assad family- they encompass 
the urban Sunni population and Bashar’s Alawite inner circle (Kilo, 2011). These elites 
have benefited most from the liberalization, and they did not try to conceal their wealth. 
On the other hand, the people outside the monopoly formed by Bashar’s clique were left 
behind and local business owners suffered from the introduction of international 
companies. The rural areas were neglected and the gaps between the urban and the rural 
living standards widened. The average spending of a household in Damascus spent an 
amount of $773 per month compared to a sum of $439 spent by a household from a rural 
area (Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Bashar’s relations with the rural areas 
were not strong compared to that of his father who used to redistribute land from 
wealthy families to peasants. In addition, the market reform has only focused on the 
cities and the service industries. By doing so, the regime ruined its relations with its 
‘primary human political base’ (Kilo).  
 
3.2.6 Islamism in Syria after the Arab Spring 
 The majority of the Syrian population compromises the Sunni sect (74%) and the 
minorities in the country are divided among Shiites (13%), Christians (10%) and Druze 
(3%). The ethnic and religious minorities have been loyal to the regime out of fear of the 
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Sunni majority that is believed to bring political Islam if it ever takes control. During the 
year 2001, Syria was slightly affected by the trend of ‘re-Islamisation’ that has been 
observed in the MENA. Islamic practices have intensified in the region after the fall of 
Baghdad and it was alleged that some Syrians have partaken in the urban violence in 
Iraq. Since the formation of the state of Syria, Islamic conservatism has been silenced by 
the socio-political system of the Ba’ath Party, which was secular and contributed to 
secular reform. Even though the regime was authoritarian, liberal and progressive 
ideologies surfaced during the 1960s and 1970s. During that period, the Muslim 
Brotherhood represented political Islam. Clashes between the latter and the authorities 
surged and ended up by prohibiting the Muslim Brotherhood. The government 
established a law forbidding anyone from becoming a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood; violating this law leads to a death sentence.  
Late 1980s, the regime began introducing religious terminology in its political 
dialogue after the Muslim Brotherhood showed some reforms and after the failure of the 
Arab Nationalist ideologies. During that period, a re-Islamization of the society started 
to occur, more mosques were built and an increasing number of veiled women appeared 
on the Syrian lands. A number of Syrian intellectuals have stated that Syrian Muslims do 
not approve of violence, and that they can partake in future democracy (Ghalioun & 
Kilo, 2009). Nevertheless, religious practices, in the cultural and social scopes, have 
increased after the 1990s, which intensified the fear among minorities, especially during 
the crisis in Iraq (Kawakibi, 2007). The regime has lessened its surveillance grip on 
small mosques and Islamic classes that were used as brainwashing sites impelling 
women on wearing veils. The judicial system was also supporting Islamic ideas wherein 
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a judge condemned a man who smoked in front of a shop during Ramadan in 2004. All 
these occurrences were considered new changes in Syria during the 2000s.  
  
 The Syrian uprising started as a popular resistance against the authoritarian rule 
without any religious affiliation. But after the conflicts with the regime started to 
escalate and spread in a lot of regions of Syria, radical Islamist dynamic started to arise 
within the opposition. Groups of Salafi-jihadists have been expanding in Syria with the 
support of foreign fighters that have connections with al-Qaeda and other groups 
(O’bagy, 2012). These groups cannot appear out of the blue, they must have been 
present in the Syrian sphere before the uprisings, and it has been claimed that the Syrian 
government has sponsored them in the last three decades. The regime’s intelligence 
apparatus had strong ties with these groups and had facilitated past jihadist activities. As 
soon as the upheavals started, crushing the protestors preoccupied the Syrian security 
apparatus, which overlooked the more lethal enemy, the Jihadists. A huge fragment of 
the protesters compromises Sunni activists who wish to create political Islamism reform. 
A number of Islamist groups have emerged after the classes started between the regime 
and the protestors. This issue has led to the radicalization of the Syrian opposition and 
has increased the hesitation of any external intervention. 
 In 2013, the Islamic State troops started operating in Syrian territories after 
having started in Iraq. The following year, they were able to win back areas in northern 
Syria and they also reached east in Dayr az Zawr, which is an area rich in oil and gas 
resources. ISIS has controlled the oilfields and profited from selling oil and gas to the 
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Syrian government. These revenues have assisted ISIS in detaching from the Iraqi al-
Qaeda and become an independent entity that pays high salaries to its fighters. ISIS also 
governed the areas they controlled and demanded taxes from local populations; they also 
took percentage of the humanitarian funds that reached their area of control (Blanchard, 
et al., 2014). ISIS has established a holistic system of governance in northeastern Syria, 
al-Raqqa, and it includes religious, educational, judicial, security and infrastructure 
projects (Caris, & Reynolds, 2014).  
 On the other hand, al-Nusra Front has appeared to establish a methodology 
derived from al-Qaeda’s social integration by fighting along the Syrian opposition and 
trying to create credibility among the Syrian populace. Al-Nusra Front worked on 
forming social integration instead of pursuing physical control of Syrian territory. A 
union between ISIS and al-Nusra Front failed after the former’s severe battles against 
activists and rebel groups during the fall of 2013. Al-Nusra Front had the priority of 
fighting against the Syrian regime, which was not demonstrated by ISIS. During this 
period, other oppositional and religious groups were marginalized. ISIS seeks to initiate 
religious outreach, in a form of Da’wa to Islam (the call), before entering an area. They 
perform Quranic recitations and religious discourses to inform the people about ISIS 
beliefs. They also provide food and drink to the dwellers of that certain area to show 
some type of unthreatening appearance. They plan on building robust governance in the 
areas they take control of by targeting education, judicial systems, strong security, 
repaired infrastructure and an independent economy (Caris, & Reynolds, 2014). So far, 
ISIS has been successful in deepening its control over their occupied areas. 
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3.3 The Geopolitics of Tunisia and Syria 
 The geopolitical structure of Tunisia and Syria vary extensively. Syria embodies 
an enormous rivalry among regional and international powers, unlike Tunisia that is less 
affected by the international power struggle. Tunisia is a relatively small country with 
inadequate natural resources and military competency. Its bordering countries are quite 
volatile, and if its borders were poorly managed, Tunisia’s internal security might 
worsen. Libya, which is considered a substantial economic partner, represents the major 
challenge for Tunisia’s foreign policy. Libya signifies the principal basis of informal 
cross border trade, which comprises 40% of Tunisia’s GDP. After Libya’s civil war, a 
huge number of Libyans moved to Tunisia for safety. The conflict in Libya presents a 
major threat to Tunisia’s economy and security. In late 2014, Tunisia enforced an exit 
tax on foreigners, which led Libya to impose its own tax with double the amount, 
knowing that there are thousands of Tunisians who still work in Libya. Activists and 
merchants protested against these impositions, and they closed the borders in Ras Jedir. 
Tunisia faced a security threat from Libyan’s extremist groups who were able to attack 
the Bardo Museum in Tunisia. The only way to manage this threat is to peacefully 
secure their borders and eschew from interfering in Libyan affairs. On the other hand, 
Tunisia’s relation with Algeria, which is the wealthiest bordering country, has positively 
developed in facing the security threats from terrorist activities. Algeria has always 
represented a balance in face of the Libyan hegemony during Qaddafi’s rule; and 
especially at this point in time, Tunisia needs to strengthen its relationship with Libya, 
which is performing counterterrorism cross-border operations. Other Arab countries, 
such as U.A.E and Egypt, tried to have Tunisia agree with them on external intervention 
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in Libya; however, Tunisia took a stand with Algeria that represented a security 
advantage. This move signified a shy away from the Saudi Arabia/Egypt/UAE axis, but 
it didn’t mean that Tunisia’s relations with those countries were shut down. On the 
contrary, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have welcomed the Tunisian president (Caid Essebsi) 
several times in 2014. Tunisia also continues with its efforts in keeping a good relation 
with UAE, which represents a means for Tunisia to repel pressure from USA and 
Europe’s calling for economic and political reform. Tunisia will need international 
support from democratic rich countries to balance its economy and support its security 
against terrorism (Cherif, 2015). Europe has been a prominent foundation for Tunisia’s 
economy and security; any new government in Tunisia will need to hold on tight to this 
type of relationship. Around eighty percent of Tunisia’s trade occurs with Western 
European countries, and 10% of Tunisians live and work in Europe.  
 
Moreover, Europeans can deter any trial from Algeria to throttle Tunisia. France 
was Tunisia’s guardian in the past, but after 2011, Tunisia’s relations with other 
European countries have been strengthened. Italy will seek Tunisia as a partner in 
Northern Africa in place of Libya. Tunisia can make use of Italy’s maritime capabilities, 
and probably update its own navy and get Italy’s support in controlling illegal maritime 
immigration. Germany can assist in strengthening Tunisia’s democracy and build 
economic ties. The only relationship that Tunisia needs to work on is its relationship 
with the USA. Tunisia already made attempts to strengthen its ties with USA by 
appointing a Prime Minister who is educated in the US, and taking into account the US 
request of including Annahda Party in the government. Tunisia is keen on including 
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democratic reforms and war on terror in its discourse with the USA. In turn, Tunisia will 
receive US support while asking for loans from international institutions, and the US 
will reinforce Tunisia’s army in face of the terrorist threat from Libya and Algeria 
(Cherif, 2015). 
 
 The situation in Syria takes us to a more escalated and complicated arena. Syria 
has strong ties with Iran and Russia, and it borders Iraq and Turkey. Any reader who is 
interested in politics can perceive the extreme intensity in the Syrian geopolitics. Syria 
has always played a significant role in the region. The invasion of Iraq has put Syria in a 
delicate situation; it tried to counter al-Qaeda, which in effect might have helped in 
stabilizing Iraq, and, at the same time, it had to balance its relationship with Iran. At that 
time, Syria was split between two major powers, Iran and the US. The former has been a 
strong ally and a major weapons’ exporter to Syria. But the direct effects of the Iraqi 
invasion appeared to be positive. Syria outlived a threat of regime change in 2003 and 
2006 (after the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the Lebanese-Israeli 
war). Syria has always used its ‘jihadi-card’ in face of regional and international powers. 
Before the US entered Iraq, Syria was supporting Saddam’s regime and keeping the 
foreign jihadists from entering Iraq from Syria. This matter made Syria a target for the 
US before 2003; however, after the US invasion of Iraq, Washington feared further 
escalation if Syria let more jihadists in Iraq. Accordingly, the US changed its stance 
towards Syria, and Syria gained a major status as a playmaker in the region. During that 
time, Syria’s relation with the Saudi Arabia had curdled, which gave time for the 
Turkish/Saudi tie to become stronger. However, Syria was facing an upsurge in Iraqi 
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refugees, internal frustration because of the one-sided economy, increasing Kurdish 
nationalism, and a decline in oil output (Simon, 2009). 
 In 2007, the Syrian regime has crushed a number of human rights activists 
groups regardless of the US demands for tolerance. The former Vice President, 
Khaddam, was verbally attacking Bashar and his regime and calling out for popular 
mobilization. Simultaneously, Syria was facing a massive Iraqi refugee influx because of 
Syria’s lenient entry policy. Even with the support of international organizations, the 
government was burdened with very high costs; Syrian infrastructure and resources were 
being depleted and the local economy was greatly affected (Naylor, 2007). Local Syrian 
population was getting fed-up with all the challenges they had to face because of 
refugees (rise in prices and in crimes). Kurdish nationalism was revived in Syria after 
the Iraqi invasion. It led to clashes between the Syrian security forces and Kurdish 
activists in Syria. Moreover, Syria had a lot of economic interest in Iraq, specifically in 
the oil market. Nonetheless, Iran and Turkey had more leverage in Iraq after 2003, 
which further affected the Syrian economy. 
 
 Syria’s relation with Washington worsened after the revival of US sanctions on 
Syria because the regime was continuing its support for terrorism and involvement in 
Lebanon. In 2005, the US started supporting Syrian opposition groups and began to meet 
with representatives of these groups. Consequently, the Bush administration provided 
the Syrian civil society with 5 million dollars. In response, the regime intensified its 
attack on local opposition and civil society (Simon, 2009). 
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3.4 External Intervention and Power Struggle 
 The external intervention in Syria and Tunisia was not direct during the 
uprisings. In Tunisia, the swift fall of Bin Ali’s regime did not put pressure on the 
international community to interfere. Moreover, the snowballing effect that led to the 
turmoil in Libya and Egypt had lessened the focus on Tunisia. On the other hand, the 
intervention in Syria was highly needed, but the strong ties that the regime had with 
Russia and Iran left the rest of the world reluctant to intervene. Knowing that Syria 
represents a strategic ally in the region, both of Iran and Russia supported the Syrian 
government with arms and ammunition. Iran also provided Syrian troops with advisors 
and gave Hezbollah the green light to fight along the Syrian army and against the 
opposition (Baumann, & et al., 2012). Russia had posed a threat to NATO by deploying 
naval vessels in Syrian waters. China and Russia also opposed the trials done by the US 
and France to establish a UN Security Council resolution on Syria. Intervention posed a 
great threat to NATO and the European Union. The only way they were able to set a 
stance is by putting sanctions on Syria and by supporting the opposition from afar. 
Nevertheless, the rise of ISIS and jihadist groups inside Syria changed the status quo.  
 The Syrian crisis represents a “proxy war” between Russia and Turkey; the 
former being a UN Security Council member and a primary support for the Assad 
regime, and the latter is a major regional power that backs up the Syrian opposition. 
Both countries intervened in Syria logistically and militarily (Akturk, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the Syrian crisis does not only resemble a Russian-Turkish proxy war, it 
also includes other international players. This crisis displays a series of interconnected 
regional and international wars in the context of struggle over influence and domination 
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beyond Syria. It is also accompanied with deep sectarian clashes in an unprecedented era 
of chaos in the Arab world and a shift in world order. During the past four years, the 
world has observed an American hesitation coupled with Russian confidence in 
advancement. Recently, Russia’s intervention has been direct through the use of its air 
force to attack ISIS and other opposition groups, without regarding any international 
accord (Abou Diab, 2015). The unfolding of external intervention is yet to show in the 
coming period; until then, the situation will continue to be utterly delicate.  
 
 After discussing the major variables in each country separately, the following 
chapter sets the analysis by linking the literature in Chapter Two with the variables. The 
main factors behind reverse waves, which Huntington discusses, are outlined in the 
Syrian crisis; as for Tunisia, its aspects that support the rise of democracy are to be 
drawn. 
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Chapter Four!
Factors of Reverse Waves and Successful 
Transitions 
 
4.1 Mode of Transition of Tunisia & Syria 
 
 The first roots of the transition started in Tunisia after Bouazizi’s self-
immolation. The mode of transition goes under the category of revolutions because there 
was a sudden mass mobilization all over the country. The same happened in Syria, but it 
was through the snowballing effect rather than a result of a single event. In both 
countries, the mode of transition was considered to be through a revolution. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in the literature, many scholars agree on the fact that a same 
mode of transition does not lead to the same result, which is shown in both countries. 
The revolution in Tunisia was successful compared to the Syrian case. The demands 
done by the protestors in Syria and Tunisia were the same: the overthrowing of the 
government and a call for democracy and a better economy. However, the protests in 
Tunisia took a more spontaneous form as compared to Syria because they erupted right 
after Bouazizi’s event. In Syria, the activists had more time to prepare while watching 
other Arab countries’ upheavals, and the regime had time, as well, to take the needed 
precautions for a predictable turmoil. This notion allows us to infer that sometimes an 
abrupt change in the status quo might assist in the political change. It is also mentioned 
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in the definition of a revolution that the upheaval needs to be sudden, as is reflected by 
the Tunisian experience.   
 On the other hand, scholars also stressed the need for the opposition groups to 
agree on the set of reforms they need to present within a time constraint. Neither in 
Tunisia nor in Syria did the opposition prepare well before protesting. Democratization 
theorists discuss this aspect by giving a minimal role for mass mobilization in the 
process of democratization. Scholars also stated that a revolution needs to include the 
threat of use of violence. In Tunisia, the upheavals were rather peaceful and the 
protestors did not demonstrate violence. This fact sets back the debate over the true 
definition of a revolution. Whereas in Syria, the regime blamed some protestors for 
being violent and instilling terror; the violence erupted during the early phase of the 
upheavals, and it escalated, leading to a civil war, as claimed by some.  
 The four aspects of a revolution as mentioned in the literature part are: sudden, 
violent, political succession, and change. If we try to link these aspects to Tunisia, the 
only aspect that does not apply is violence. The other factors, however, were present, 
and so far the change has shown to be successful. As for Syria, the only present factor 
was violence, which certainly appears to have a very adverse effect on the result.  
 
4.2 The Allocation of the Requisites  
 Though the debate on what requisites a country should possess to be able to 
democratize is not absolutely settled, there are still a number of characteristics that are 
considered ground foundations for the establishment of democracy. The primary factor 
57!!
that is discussed is the economic condition in a country before the induction of 
democracy. Economic inequality was present in both countries; there was a very high 
percentage of unemployment especially among the youth. In past decades, the education 
in the Arab countries has developed and the percentage of educated citizens has 
increased in comparison to the past. However, the economy was not capable of 
providing job markets to the considerable number of graduates. The unemployment rate 
in Tunisia was higher than that of Syria. Regardless of which was higher, the 
unemployment rate was considered to be an aspect found in all the Arab countries that 
went through uprisings after 2010 (Campante & Chor, 2012). This issue shows that 
economic inequality is a prerequisite for a demand for change and probably revolution. 
However, as Lipset and other modernization theorists argue, economic inequality might 
not help in the democratization process. They assert that a strong and developed 
economy is needed for democracy to be established. The economies of Tunisia and Syria 
are both weak. Even with the liberalization that Syria underwent after Bashar, it only 
benefited a small elite group who had strong ties with the regime. The same goes for 
Tunisia where the Trabulsi family had gained most from Tunisia’s largest businesses 
(Trabulsi family are the relatives of Bin Ali’s wife). Thus, by comparing both countries, 
we find that the economic factor is very similar in both.  
 Culture is another factor that scholars consider to be one of the requisites for 
democracy. The democratic culture is usually represented by freedom of speech, free 
media and human rights. The regimes of Syria and Tunisia have been strict with those 
types of freedoms. Both regimes have history in restricting the media and curtailing 
human rights; many activists have been imprisoned or exiled from their respective 
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countries. The human rights aspect of culture is very important as it encompasses 
various types of freedoms. When a group of people suffers from autocracy for a long 
period of time, a rapid attainment of freedom might backfire on them. This point is 
where the strength of reform comes in to enhance the effectiveness of the newly 
achieved freedom. In Tunisia, the activists appeared to be ready for the change and high 
maturity has been shown in the way both sides of the society (the Islamists and the 
secularists) have been able to cope together and relieve each other’s fears. Nevertheless, 
the oppositional groups in Syria were quite divided and uncoordinated. The regime was 
able to instill terror and expand the rebellion’s disorganization (Jenkins, 2014). Syrian 
oppositional groups were not able to merge together under one national strategy. They 
only operated via a ‘guerilla campaign’ trying to fight back the regime’s security 
apparatus. However, that does not mean that the blame is on them, for the Assad regime 
has been known for its harsh and devastating techniques; this time it took the regime 
longer to silence the uproar because of the involvement of terrorists groups who were 
previously sustained by the regime itself.  
 The third element of democracy requisites that is discussed in the literature 
chapter is religion. This factor has the biggest influence in both countries. Even though 
the Sunnis are the majority in both countries, but the Syrian population has a fraction of 
other sectarian and religious minorities. In Tunisia, the only challenge is between the 
Islamists main party (Annahda) and the secularists groups in the country. So far, this 
challenge has been pacified by the moderation that was shown by Annahda Party. On the 
other hand, Islamists in Syria have shown an unprecedented extremism which hindered 
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the possibility for minorities to join in the upheavals. This aspect is further analyzed in 
the part where Huntington’s propositions are analyzed.  
 
4.3 Huntington’s Manifestation in Syria and Tunisia 
 As previously discussed, Samuel Huntington has a lot of input on the backlash of 
revolutions and factors behind democratic waves. After considering the main variables 
in the cases of Syria and Tunisia, we can now form a link between the variable in each 
case and Huntington’s prepositions. The start of the Arab Spring first gives an 
impression that Huntington’s third wave is being revived. However, upon taking a closer 
look on the democratic shifts in the international arena and the backlash of the 
revolution in Syria, one can infer that the wave is certainly not democratic yet.  
 In Tunisia, the revolution has been quite successful thus far, and the regime 
change has been easy compared to Syria’s case. Huntington’s account on the effect of 
mass mobilization is contested through the Tunisian experience. He argues that most of 
the democratic governments have been established from top to bottom rather from 
bottom to top, disregarding any ability for the masses to be able to cause any democratic 
shift. In Tunisia, the masses caused the change, not the governmental institutions. Yet, 
there are other aspects of the Tunisian case that aided in the change. These aspects can 
be linked to Huntington’s factors behind the democratic wave. Tunisia only relates to 
two out of three from Huntington’s factors behind democratic waves; the first is that:  
-Authoritarian regimes are facing difficulty in legitimizing their rule where citizens are 
open to democratic values and are going through profound economic instabilities. 
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The Tunisian population has been widely exposed to the advancement in technology and 
the people have always been open to advanced democratic cultures from Europe. Both 
factions of the Tunisian population, the Islamists and the secularists, have shared the 
European moderation experience through living in Europe and receiving a lot of tourists 
in their homeland.  
The second complying factor is: - The economic advancement during the 1960s has led 
to the expansion of the middle classes in a number of countries; 
The Tunisian middle class has represented the masses that rose against the regime. The 
Tunisian middle class was established through hard work compared to other Arab oil-
exporting countries. However, the Assad regime in Syria was keen on crushing the 
middle class and making sure that it is kept under his control. 
 
4.4 Reverse Wave in the MENA 
 Reverse waves are expressed through the decline in freedom, human rights and 
peace. The two examined cases represent a country in the Middle East and another in 
North Africa. The primary is showing a lot of factors that show a reverse wave that is 
growing in the Middle East. Below, Huntington’s factors of reverse wave are stated with 
reference to Syria. These cases can also be linked to other countries in the Middle East, 
especially Iraq. Since the invasion of Iraq, terrorism has spread in the region, and an 
extended war has been taking place between different armed factions. The same has 
been occurring in Syria after 2012. There is a massive rise of terrorist groups that are 
disguised by radical Islamic parties, which want to establish an Islamic Empire in the 
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region. There is no sign of peace in the near future. On the contrary, it seems that 
extremism is spreading wider that the region itself.  
 Huntington’s factors behind reverse waves are the main inferences that can be 
made after studying the Syrian crisis. We start by stating the first factor mentioned by 
Huntington: -the democratic values among the elite groups and the public were not 
strong enough. The Assad rule in Syria has managed to abash democratic values among 
Syrians by incorporating its intelligence in every town in Syria. The population in Syria 
is used to sabotaging freedoms by being an extension of the government. This point 
needs further study in the field of social psychology. Moreover, the way the Syrian 
opposition was not able to merge into one strong group shows how the society is 
fractured. The Syrian society has not been as exposed as the Tunisian society is. In 
Tunisia, Bourguiba’s very modern reforms have continued throughout the past decades, 
making the society more exposed to cultural liberalization instead of conservatism. This 
matter has given rise to a secular society in Tunisia; one which holds on tight to these 
modern reforms that include the Personal Status Code that abolishes polygamy and that 
gives women marital rights. Tunisians are used to these forms of rights; that’s why the 
Islamists have not try to meddle with them yet, for they know that the Tunisian society is 
deeply accustomed to such civil rights.  
 Neither Hafiz nor Bashar had introduced modern reforms as those of Bourguiba’s. The 
society in Syria was never subjected to such modern modifications. Plus, the regime has 
overlooked the conservatism that was found in almost all Syrian rural areas. The revival 
of Islamic traditions that took place a decade ago was accepted by the regime without 
being limited or at least controlled. Even though the Ba’ath Party is a secular party and 
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the Assad family is from the Alawite sect, the reforms that the Ba’ath Party established 
still had to do more with the economy rather than the society.  
 The second factor for reverse waves discussed by Huntington is: -rigorous 
economic downfalls deepened social conflict and opened the path for solutions that can 
only be imposed by authoritarian governments. The economic downfalls were present in 
both of Syria and Tunisia; however, the length of the crisis in Syria has put more stress 
on the society and deepened the economic struggle. The humanitarian support was not 
strong enough and sometimes it did not reach all the areas. This gap was filled by the 
extremists groups, whether al-Nusra Front or ISIS. Both groups were able to financially 
support their followers. As previously mentioned, when ISIS takes control over a 
specific area, it forms a separate state with all the needed institutions. ISIS here 
represents the substitute of an authoritarian government, which seeks to establish strict 
control and, in return, provides the adherents with basic services as humanitarian aid, 
bakeries, water and electricity (Caris & Reynolds, 2014). These aspects also touch on 
Huntington’s third factor, which states: -social and political divisions caused by leftist 
governments required swift social and economic reforms. ISIS was able to provide the 
swift social and economic reforms, which are quite autocratic, but they deliver the basic 
needs for their followers. !
In Tunisia, the short time span between the regime fall and the establishment of the 
constituent assembly was not enough for a third party to interfere and fill the gap. 
Moreover, after the fall of Bin Ali, there was no social conflict in Tunisia. Both forms of 
the opposition were in consent about the following steps to take, making it easier to go 
forward.  
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 The fifth and sixth factors that Huntington discusses state that the revolution 
leaves behind a state of anarchy in the country and gives way for an external 
nondemocratic power to fill this gap. This concept is exactly replicated in the Syrian 
case. The upheavals turned into an armed conflict between different factions of the 
society. Early during the upheavals, the main actors were the Syrian protestors, who 
represent the educated middle class youth, and their families. But shortly after, the 
regime started to instill terror through its armed militias (al-shabiha), which led some 
opposition to react violently as well. During this unprecedented anarchy, strong 
extremist groups started to emerge. ISIS was also able to come in through the borders 
since the Syrian army was focused on the protesters and internal security. All these 
factors coincide with Huntington’s propositions about reverse waves, which show that 
the crisis in Syria does represent an example of a reverse wave.  
 Another differing factor between Syria and Tunisia is the intervention of the 
army. As stated in the methodology part, Bin Ali’s primary support in the country was 
the security apparatus. When the upheavals started, the army took a neutral side and they 
did not stop or attack the protestors; however, the Syrian regime’s primary apparatus 
was the army. The latter had spread in all Syrian regions where protests took place. They 
initiated the attacks against the activists first in Damascus and then in Dar’a (Noueihed 
& Warren, 2012). This aspect has affected the flow of events in each country differently.  
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Table 5: Resulting Factors of Reverse Waves 
Factors Syria Tunisia 
1. Democratic values  -There has been no sign of democratic values 
except during the primary protests. Assad’s 
regime has crushed any form of cultural or 
political reform 
-Political factions have shown 
great understanding of their 
political freedom and they 
showed great organization. 
Bourguiba’s cultural reforms 
were reflected in high 
acceptance of secularism 
2. Economic Downfalls  -Halted foreign investment 
-Closure of a lot of businesses  
-The Syrian Central Bank reserve dropped to 
$2 billion by the end of 2012; it was $18 
billion at the beginning of the conflict (Syrian 
Center for Policy Research, 2013) 
-Unemployment rate 40% by the year 2014 
(CIA, 2015) 
-Improvement in budget deficit 
by 2.1% from 2013 to 2014 
(World Bank, 2015) 
-Production declines and 
commercial services decline 
(World Bank) 
-Unemployment rate still high 
(15.2%) 
3. Social and political divisions -Weak opposition led to diverging factions 
-Social divisions reflected through different 
extremists groups 
-Highly organized opposition 
-Islamists show moderation and 
acceptance of opposing groups 
-Post-Bin Ali elections were 
held successfully 
4. Middle and upper classes 
excluding the populist classes 
from power 
-The Assad regime was keen on crushing the 
middle class and the upper classes maintain 
their control  
-Middle and populist classes 
were able to overthrow Bin Ali 
-Constituent Assembly was 
formed from all classes without 
any exclusion 
5. Rise of terrorism after the 
collapse of law and order 
-Numerous terrorist groups were formed after 
the upheavals (ISIS, Nusra Front, Soqour al-
Sham, Umma Brigade…etc) 
-Minor influx of terrorism from 
Libya  
6. Intervention of external 
nondemocratic powers 
-Intervention of a number of nondemocratic 
countries and extremists groups (Russia, Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, Arab Gulf…etc) 
-No intervention was presented. 
European countries showed 
their support for reform. 
Tunisia forms relations with 
Algeria to secure borders with 
Libya  
7. Reverse snowballing -Needs further research  -Needs further research 
8. Human Rights  -Civil Liberties: 7 [the worst] (Freedom 
House, 2015) 
-Civil Liberties: 3 (Freedom 
House, 2015) 
9. Political freedom -Political Rights: 7 (Freedom House, 2015) -Political Rights: 1 (Freedom 
House) 
10. Existence of peace -War between numerous factions -Peace is sustained 
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4.5 Emerging Sectarian Dynamics 
 Unfortunately, the Syrian crisis is also a result of regional sectarian struggle. The 
past decade has been reverberating with deep sectarian mayhem between Sunnis and 
Shiites. The invasion of Iraq and the Lebanese 2006 war have amplified the Shiite-Sunni 
identities in the region. After the fall of Saddam, Sunni extremist groups have tried to 
conquest parts of the country by attacking any other faction they face. On the other hand, 
the 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon was initiated and fought by Hezbollah, which 
is a Shiite party. Both groups have connections with regional powers presented by Saudi 
Arabia and Iran respectively. The former is a Sunni based country, which is a major 
support for all Sunnis in the region. Iran is the Shiite basis, which also supports all the 
Shiites in the region. The Syrian regime was involved in both sides: first, it reinforced 
terrorist groups on its land to use it as a threat in the face of the international community. 
It also supported Hezbollah by being the middleman between Iran and Lebanon. 
Hezbollah has depended on the Syrian government’s ability to send weapons from Iran 
to Lebanon without being obstructed. As a result, Iran has been backing the Assad 
regime to keep its interests in the region stable. Iran uses the strong presence of 
Hezbollah in Lebanon to intimidate Israel and, thus, to send a message to USA. 
Moreover, the Syrian foreign affairs in the last ten years have taken a turn from 
balancing the relations between USA/Europe and Iran/Russia. The regime has 
disregarded most of the calls for non-involvement from the international community, 
and it focused on its relations with Iran and Russia. Recently, Russia has been playing a 
major role in the Syrian crisis, and it is on the edge of confrontation with Turkey, which 
is also a major power in the region.  
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 Regional powers have been active in the Syrian crisis so that they can secure 
their interests in the region. Nevertheless, these interests are translated into sectarian 
rhetoric and violence. The intervention in Syria has a lot of differing actors that are 
regional and international. It will be difficult, at this stage, to withdraw from the region 
without securing their interests. The Assad regime had the leading role in creating these 
sectarian clashes. The regimes’ policies have been pro-Alawite. Most of the high ranks 
in Syrian security apparatus are led by Alawites. The regime has always manipulated the 
minorities by employing the threat of the Sunni majority. Simultaneously, the regime 
has been engaging in deliberate radicalization of the Sunnis. The polarization between 
Sunnis and Alawites has surfaced and intensified with sectarian extensions in the region.  
The extremist groups have capitalized on the Syrian Sunni hatred towards the 
regime and the Alawite sect. Such groups were able to attract fighters from all Sunni 
regions in Syria and from other countries as well. ISIS was able to build an army of 
more than 22,000 fighters from Syria, Iraq, Europe and the USA (Sedgwick, 2015). It 
makes use of the Internet and social media to reach out as wide as possible and to spread 
its propaganda. An immense number of ISIS fighters are highly educated and disaffected 
youth who were able to view the savage activities that ISIS spreads on its social media. 
When it first started spreading, ISIS depended on funding from the Arabian Gulf, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait. However, after they were able to take control over resourceful 
territories, they have become self-sustaining. The Syrian government buys oil from ISIS 
through the black market (Sedgwick).   
On the other hand, Iran has been backing up the Alawites in Syria, and it has also 
sent Shiite volunteers to fight along the regime’s army. Hezbollah would have never 
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entered Syrian territories to fight against the opposition if it weren’t under Iran’s consent 
and instructions. The Supreme Leader Khamenei regarded the Arab Spring as a “natural 
continuation of the Iranian revolution of 1979” (Alfoneh, 2011). This statement shows 
that Iranians viewed the Arab Spring as an Islamic revival rather than a democratic 
revolution.  
The external interventions of regional and international powers have intensified 
the sectarian struggle in the region. Each sectarian group is getting support from its 
respective ally by receiving money or weaponry. Nevertheless, these extremist groups 
have been able to place threats on Western countries, such as what happened on 
November 13th, 2016 in Paris. These tragic events might change the international world 
order and affect more than the region.  
All the factors of a reverse wave are being presented in Syria, which is a Middle 
Eastern country facing external interventions from authoritarian governments. The 
radical Islamist groups are representing the reverse wave in the MENA. Nevertheless, 
democracy is decline in other parts of the world as well because of the change in 
international power structure. More dictatorships are being able to control international 
politics without direct repercussions.  
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
 
5.1 Discussion of Findings 
 As stated by the French political thinker, Alexis de Tocqueville, “In a revolution, as in a 
novel, the most difficult part to invent is the end.” (1866). The Arab Spring began in late 2010, 
but the world is still facing the effects of its upheavals. Tunisia was the first country whose 
population rose against its authoritarian regime, and a couple of months after the series of 
protests in the country, Bin Ali stepped down from his realm. Nonetheless, the ripples that 
affected other countries are still active and are reaching farther from the region. The primary 
reflections on the Arab Spring were quite positive. Most politicians and social scientists 
regarded it as the period when the ‘Middle East exceptionalism’ will banish. However, they did 
not anticipate what was yet to come. The series of counter-revolutions that have spread in more 
than one country reflect upon Huntington’s reverse wave theory. The third democratic wave that 
started 30 years ago has not affected the Middle East and North Africa; however, the third 
reverse wave might be starting to emerge from the region, specifically from the Middle East. 
The listed factors of reverse waves can be also linked to other Middle Eastern countries. 
 No one was able to predict any change in the region. Instead, political scientists were 
busy trying to analyze the reasons why democracy is not flourishing in the Arab world. The 
uprisings in Tunisia quickly spread across the North African and Middle Eastern countries, 
causing a lot of uproar in the cities, and even in the rural areas. The protestors in each country 
shared similar demands, ones which called for regime change and reform. They also had in 
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common the agony resulting from the continuous autocracy and inequality of the long-lasting 
authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, each regime reacted differently to the protestors. As 
Anderson argues, each regime is unique, and we cannot consider that the activists are facing the 
same opponent (Anderson, 2011). Protestors depended on the use of social media as a catalyst 
and a forum to share their experience and as a means of communication during the uprisings. 
The media assisted in the snowballing effect. Citizens in other authoritarian countries were able 
to observe what was happening, and it gave them the incentive to start their own revolution. 
Unfortunately, activists did not consider the fact that each country has its own geopolitical 
situation. Even the protestors were of different demographics; in Tunisia, the upheavals started 
in the rural areas and moved towards the cities, but Egyptian protestors were from the urban and 
cosmopolitan areas (Anderson). Moreover, the activists couldn’t rely on the international 
community’s intervention because interests differ from country to another.  
 Syria and Tunisia were chosen as the two case studies because they represent a grand 
failure and a probably success respectively. The comparison between both countries shows the 
main aspects that have led to the wide variance shown by the two experiences. It was obvious 
that what started as a revolution in both countries had different results. The mode of transition 
depends on specific requisites that cannot be guaranteed in a country. The economic situation in 
Tunisia and Syria comprised high levels of inequalities between different factions in the 
country. Most of the wealth was divided among the elites of the countries and the people who 
had strong ties with the regime. The Makhlouf family in Syria was a replicate of the Trabulsi 
family in Tunisia. Both regimes have managed to ignore the rural parts of the countries, 
disregarding the demands of their dwellers. The youth of the rural areas were getting more and 
more qualified and educated, but they were jobless. Unemployment in both countries was 
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staggering high, and the cities were getting flooded with numbers of unemployed educated 
youth. Nevertheless, the regimes were not coping with the distress that was increasing with 
time. The security apparatus in Tunisia was always taking advantages of the poor. On the other 
hand, it was the Syrian army that has used and is still abusing its citizens. Yet, these similarities 
between Syria and Tunisia were not enough to ensure a similar outcome.   
Both countries incorporated groups of Islamists, but their nature differed. After the regime’s fall 
in Tunisia, the leader of Annahda Party, Gannouchi, arrived to the country from exile. 
Numerous followers awaited his arrival, which at first posed a threat to the secular groups of 
Tunisia. However, Annahda members were keen on pacifying the fears of their fellow activists. 
Gannouchi appeared to be more moderate than expected. Until now, the Tunisian Islamists are 
not trying to Islamize the country in any way. They are showing that Islamists can be politically 
active under a democratic system. Conversely, the upsurge of radical Islamism in Syria shows a 
totally different experience. The Assad regimes have history in supporting terrorist groups and 
in using them as a threat in the region. Shortly after the upheavals in Syria escalated into violent 
confrontations between the army and the protestors, radical Islamic groups started to emerge 
and gain grounds of the unprecedented chaos. The location of Syria had a lot to add to the 
equation. Firstly, the sectarian struggle that has been going on for the past decade in the region 
gave an incentive for marginalized Sunnis of Syria to rise in the face of the regime. Extremist 
groups that were primarily viewed as opposition got support from regional powers such as 
Saudi Arabia, Arab Gulf and Turkey. On the other hand, the regime was getting support from 
Iran and Russia: two dictatorships that are gaining more grounds in the international society. 
The Freedom House reports have been showing a decline in democracy in a lot of countries. 
Huntington is able to provide factors of reverse waves, which coincide with the rise of radical 
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Islamism in Syria and the region. However, he is not able to state when the third reverse wave 
would start. Many scholars are analyzing the regression of democracy. Strong democratic 
governments are finding difficulty in providing good economic standards for their citizens. 
Unemployment is a major issue in a lot of European countries, and educated youth are suffering 
from the consequences of their governmental incapability. Radical groups are providing the 
needs for their followers and gaining grounds. Islam is not radical. ISIS and other formations 
are abusing religious courses to terrorize weak-minded followers. Extremism in Syria has been 
instilled by the regime itself with the support of its allies. The sectarian dynamics in the region 
is representing a proxy war between regional and international powers and the recent events are 
demonstrating this proposition. Huntington’s reverse wave theory might have already started.  
 With all the chaos occurring, Tunisia is the last hope for the region. The geopolitical 
situation in Tunisia has been of great aid to the sequence of events. Political reforms have 
already been established in Tunisia since 2011, and the National Constituent Assembly has 
incorporated the major political players there. A new institution was adopted in 2014, which 
was followed by parliamentary and presidential elections. Economic reforms have not been 
implemented yet; the successive governments are focused on the political transition and the 
internal security of the country. The new government will need to concentrate on developing its 
economy to avoid any security relapse.  
 
5.2 Research Limitations 
 The cases under study are facing recent developments and changes; hence, the analysis 
might be challenged with the future course of events. Up until now, Tunisia is viewed as a 
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success and an addition to the Islamic democratic states. Nevertheless, the coming years might 
alter the governance, and Annahda Party might take a different stance as the events unfold in the 
MENA. A more detailed research that incorporates additional Islamic countries that are 
successful democracies is needed to support the main hypothesis of this paper. Moreover, the 
reverse wave theory can also be examined through the inclusion of powerful authoritarian states 
that are developing and controlling the international arena. Democracy has always been a 
contested notion, and as the recent political events are unfolding, we might witness a new form 
of governance. The coming years will demonstrate whether Huntington’s theory is to be proved 
or refuted. Islamism can be further studied and analyzed upon recent manifestations, but that 
matter will need to be presented through a more thorough and extensive research.  
 The findings in this paper only tackle two countries, one in the Middle East and another 
in North Africa. In future research, more Middle Eastern countries need to be analyzed and the 
level of democracy in each country should be examined. Reverse waves are illustrated through 
negative shifts in political freedom, human rights and peace. As reported by the Freedom 
House, democracy is in decline and more countries are becoming more authoritarian. To 
confirm the reverse wave theory upon the MENA, more countries need to be included in future 
research and the factors showing a decline in democracy need to be pointed out in each country.  
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